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PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN REGULATION
OF CONSUMER CREDIT*
F. B. HUBACHEIt
An article entitled "The Development of Regulatory Small Loan Laws" by this
author in the 1941 Winter issue of Law and Contemporary Problems dealt with
the development of regulatory small loan laws during the period ending about X940.
The purpose of the present article is to review subsequent developments in the
same general field. It cannot cover precisely the same field because the periods
1916-i94o and 1940-1953 were basically different in significant respects. Some
factors carried over but during the latter period the problems arising from the com-
plexities of legitimate consumer lending were added to those of eliminating the
illegal high-rate lender. The loan shark problem remains the crux but others have
been created.
It is virtually impossible to draw a date line across this subject and state the then
existing conditions accurately. Statutes and decisions can, of course, be dated but
basic changes occur gradually. Events which seem mere incidents at the time
emerge later as indications of a trend. To generalize with reasonable accuracy on
this subject one can seldom refer to a specific date, but must use a longer period.
Accordingly, "1940" and "i953" will be used in general statements herein as approxi-
mations only.
The loan shark evil is a modern, specialized aspect of the problem of usury.
Whereas usury laws go back through the centuries, the loan shark did not begin
to become an acute economic problem until the industrial revolution started in the
eighteen seventies. It developed with the movement of population from rural to
urban areas, the mechanization of industry, mass production, and dependence on
paychecks. It is a concomitant of the wage system. Births, deaths, illnesses, un-
employment, changes of residence, educational needs, misfortunes, or improvidence
found families lacking reserves of food, clothing, shelter, or money and without
land or skills by which they could sustain themselves. Borrowing or charity be-
came their only means of emergency relief.
The bare costs of small installment loans to wage earners could not be covered
by the percentage charges permitted under orthodox usury laws. Legitimate lenders
could not supply the constantly growing demand at a loss. Charitable organizations
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could scarcely begin to cope with it. The borrowers lacked business experience and
the ability to enforce their meager legal remedies. Their need made them desperate.
Their only source of credit or loans was the money bootlegger, whose extortionate
charges and harsh collection methods earned the term "loan shark."
These economic and social changes had been gradual and only a few realized
that they called for drastic changes in the usury laws. Lawmakers clung to the
age-old concept that charging over 6 per cent was malum in se, and hence the
sorry succession of efforts to put out the economic fire by statutory prohibitions
and penalties. Inevitably the conflagration raged hotter.
Eventually, starting in the eighteen nineties, a few industrialized states were
forced to a more realistic attitude. They enacted experimental laws which timidly, or
unconsciously, recognized that wage earners must borrow when the thin gap between
wages and necessities closed. Finally, in I9o7, the Russell Sage Foundation entered
the lists as a champion of the wage earner, and combating the loan shark then
began in earnest. By 1916 the Uniform Small Loan Law' had been drafted as the
weapon for that purpose.
This law has virtually eliminated the loan shark wherever it has been enacted in
full. It has done so by permitting a regulated, commercial, competitive source of
consumer loans to operate at much lower than the loan shark's rates though sub-
stantially higher than ordinary usury limits. By 1940 there was wide public ac-
ceptance of this law and the operations under it. The most serious opposition to its
maintenance and extension came from loan sharks operating in unregulated states,
licensees who wished to capture additional profits, and other lenders whose opera-
tions would be affected.
That was the situation when the earlier article was written. What are the most
important subsequent developments? What influences have been at work and what
changes have they produced?
Because the important developments during this period include legal, economic,
and social changes which affect business and government and the daily lives of our
people, it is impossible to review them chronologically, by cause and effect, or on
any other single plan. There are, however, certain crisscrossing lines of cleavage
which suggest the following headings under which appropriate material may be
grouped:
1 Terminology. Because consumer loans are small in comparison with business or productive loans,
the former came to be known as "small loans," and the laws regulating lenders making them came
to be known as "small loan laws." These terms are now inappropriate as they do not refer to the
distinguishing characteristics of consumer loans-that they are made to finance consumer needs and
are repayable in installments. "Consumer loans" and "consumer finance" are being used increasingly
to describe such loans. The broader term "consumer credit" is universally used to mean both con-
sumer loan and sale credit, the latter being extended as an incident of a sale transaction. Because of
the variety of laws regulating the making of consumer loans, however, the laws providing the
primary regulation are still called "small loan laws" when necessary to distinguish them from other
consumer loan laws. Lenders doing business under small loan laws are usually the only group which is
licensed, and hence they are often called "licensed lenders" or "licensees."
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I. Influence of Russell Sage Foundation.
II. Small loan legislation-recapitulation.
III. Newer types of consumer lenders-their regulation.
IV. Larger loans and smaller profit margins.
V. Convenience and advantage provision.
VI. Credit life and disability insurance.
VII. Special constitutional problems.
VIII. Trend toward a code.
IX. Regulation W-economic considerations.
X. The present situation.
I
INFLUENCE OF RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION
To the Russell Sage Foundation, an endowed philanthropic agency, must be
credited the sound statutory foundation of the small loan (consumer finance) busi-
ness.? The Foundation began its work in the remedial loan field in 1907.8 Its
studies dislosed a vital need for small loans among wage earners which was not
being met by orthodox lenders but rather by loan sharks who cruelly exploited their
victims. One result was the drafting in 1916 of the model Uniform Small Loan
Law which has been the guide for all effective subsequent small loan legislation
The following over-all, inclusive, maximum monthly rates, computed strictly on
the unpaid principal balances of money actually advanced to the borrower, without
discounting or compounding, are allowed by existing small loan laws on all or a
portion of the loan balance: 3-2 per cent in 7 states, 3 per cent in 19 states, 2-Y/ per
cent in 6 states, 2 per cent in one state, and slightly over 2 per cent in 2 states; and
one state provides for interest and fees.
After releasing its first draft of USLL, the Foundation continued to observe
and study consumer finance and the effects of laws regulating its various aspects.
' For development of laws regulating the small loan (consumer finance) business, see the following,
all published by the Russell Sage Foundation (New York): ROBINSON AND NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE
SMA.L LOAN BUSINESS (935); GALLERT, HILBORN AND MAY, SMALL LOAN LEGISLATiON (1932); HUBA-
CIEK, ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOAN LAws (s938); and GLENN, BRANIYr AND ANDREWS, RUSSELL SAGE
FouNDATIoN 1907-1946 (r947).
GLENN, BRANrr AND ANDREWS, id. at 65.
"The principal features of the Uniform Small Loan Law have been summarized: "(I) licensing ...
of lenders; (2) special authorization to licensees .. . to charge a maximum monthly per cent rate on
unpaid balances, which is substantially greater than the general usury maximum; (3) prohibition against
extra charges; (4) detailed regulations as to the conduct of business by licensees; (5) prohibitions against
evasions by licensees and non-licensees; (6) supervision by a state official; (7) criminal and civil penalties
for violations; (8) maximum loan size to which the act applies, originally $3oo but usually $Soo or
more in recent legislation; (9) exemption of banks, industrial banks, building or savings and loan
associations, credit unions, and pawnbrokers. The regulations as to the conduct of business are designed
to protect small borrowers from the fraud and oppression possible because of their inadequate bargaining
position. These include, for example, a prohibition against misleading advertising and requirements that
the lender give the borrower a statement of his loan transaction and a receipt for each payment. Un-
licensed lenders, unless expressly exempted, are specifically limited to the maximum provided by the
usury law and are subject to severe penalties for exceeding this maximum either directly or by subterfuge."
ROGER S. BARRurr, COMPILATION OF CONSUMsER FINANCE LAws xiv (NAT. CONSUMER FIN. Ass'N, 1952).
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Its published material and presentations at hearings gained the support of legislators,
public officials, Better Business Bureaus, Legal Aid Societies, labor unions, philan-
thropic organizations, and other public spirited groups, for legislation which it recom-
mended. Seven drafts of the Foundation's uniform bill were published, the last
in 1942. The basic principles of the first draft were continued in all later drafts.
Changes merely improved the law to meet changing conditions.5
By x942 the Russell Sage Foundation had come to believe that its work in this
field was largely completed. The principles of sound regulation and rate statement
had been tested, proved effective, and accepted. Thereafter the Foundation di-
minished its activity. The untimely death of Dr. Roll Nugentl shortly after World
War II ended its active participation, though the influence of its pioneer work of
course continues to be a vital factor.
No like agency has emerged to assume the role of protector of the consumer
debtor. Without the leadership of a strong and universally respected agency, dedi-
cated to the public good, the movement for firm, consistent regulation of all con-
sumer creditors has faltered. In many cases, fundamental differences in the
statutory treatment of different types of lending institutions which are actually
distinguished from each other only by their names and business histories, have
been perpetuated instead of being broken down. A few states have recently
abandoned some of the basic concepts of the Uniform Small Loan Law.
Studies of small loan and sales finance problems are being continued by pro-
fessors and research institutions. This promotes an understanding of consumer
credit and provides a constructive influence on regulatory legislation. The efforts,
however, are uncoordinated and insufficiently publicized. Although the National
Consumer Finance Association and its Law Forum have published much useful
material,7 there has been no impartial headquarters for the dissemination of findings
or publications.
Since 1942 there has been moderate need for revision of the Uniform Small Loan
Law. To meet this need the National Consumer Finance Association in 1948
drafted and published a Model Consumer Finance Act which preserves the basic
features of the Uniform Small Loan Law. It differs in important details and it
has been considerably simplified, continuing a process started by the Foundation.
It is an endorsement and perpetuation of the principles of the Uniform Small Loan
Law.
' For differences between the drafts, see historical discussion following each annotated section in
HUBACIEK, op. cit. supra note 2; Foreword by Nugent, id. at vii; Historical Development by Nugent,
id. at 193.
'Dr. Nugent was the last Director, Department of Consumer Credit Studies, Russell Sage Foundation,
succeeding Mr. Leon Henderson.
' BAtRETr, op. cit. supra note 4; BtRTT AND ULRICH, INDEX TO LEGAL LITERATURE ON REoULATION
OF CONSUMER INSTALLMENT LENDING AND ON USURY LAws (1940); BARRErr AND ULRICH, SUPPLEMENT
To ANNOTATIONS 0N SMALL LOAN LAws (mimeographed, 1948); HALLER, CONSUMER INSTALLMENT LOANS
(bibliography, 1945); SURVEY OF SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS! CIVIL RELIEF ACT IN RELATION TO CONSUMER
CREDIT OBLIGATIONS (1950); OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR BANKRUPTCY (1951); FEDERAL LAws AND
THEIR APPLICATION TO THE CONSUMER FINANCE BUSINESS (mimeographed, 1952); Consumer Finance Law
Bulletin, published quarterly since June 1947; Model Consumer Finance Act (1948).
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II
SMALL LOAN LEGISLATION-REcAPITULATION
When "Combating the Loan Shark" was written, 27 states had effective small
loan laws resembling one or more drafts of the USLL, three states had partially
effective small loan laws, and five had laws resembling the USLL which were in-
effective because the permitted rates were too lowYs Since then six additional states
(Idaho, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming) have en-
acted small loan laws either patterned on or strongly influenced by the USLL,
although the laws of all these states except Idaho and Washington are deficient in
important respects. The 36 states now having effective or partially effective small
loan laws include most of the large industrial states and have about 79 per ceht of
the United States population against about 74 per cent in i94o. Under these laws,
small loans totaling $2,67i,oooooolo were made in 1952.
Late in 1939 the Canadian Parliament enacted a small loan law applicable
throughout the Dominion, based on the USLL principles, with a $5oo loan limit,
effective January I, 1940.1
In addition to the extension of regulation to new states, progress has been made
since 1940 in the improvement of then existing laws. The Uniform Small Loan
Law was substantially strengthened in the fifth draft (1932) by the addition of
broad discretionary powers. The most important were discretionary licensing on
the basis of various criteria, power to prohibit dual business operations, and power
to adopt rules and regulations. These provisions have since been adopted in many
states, either as a part of new small loan laws or by amendment of existing laws.
Much of this progress has occurred since 1940. The number of small loan laws
having the convenience and advantage licensing restriction increased from 13 to
23;12 the number delegating rule making power increased from 15 to 3o;"' and the
number having a dual business restriction increased from 15 to 24.14
That is the score of principal accomplishments since 1940 in extending the
frontiers against loan sharks and improving the situation in previously regulated
territory. How much remains to be done?
'Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small Loan Laws, 8 LAw & CONThENP. PRoD. xo8, 123
(1941). Effective laws: Ariz., Cal., Conn., Fla., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ky., La., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn.,
Mo., N.H., N.J., N.Y., Ohio, Ore., Pa., R.I., Utah, Vt., Va., W. Va., Wis. Partially effective laws: Colo.,
Neb., N.M. Ineffective laws: Ala., Ark., D.C., Ga., Tenn. For citations to and reprints of small loan, usury,
and related laws, as of 1952, see BARRETr, Op. cir. supra note 4.
'U. S. CENSUS OF POPULATION (1950); CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION ESTIMATES (BUR.
oF CENSUS, U. S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, March 24, 1953).
1039 FED. RES. BULL. 276 (March, 1953). "13 GEo. VI, C. 23, C. 30, §12 (1939).
"Having restriction in 1940: Conn., Ill., Ky., Mich., Minn., N. J., N. Y., Pa., R.I., Utah (in banking
law), Vt., W. Va., Wis. Subsequently adopting restriction: Idaho, La., Md., Neb., Nev., N.M., Ohio,
Okla., Ore., Wash.
" Rule-making in 1940: Cal., Conn., Ill., Ind., Ky., Mass., Mich., Minn., N.J., N.Y., R.I., Utah, Vt.,
W. Va., Wis. Subsequendy authorizing rule.making: Colo., Fla., Idaho, Iowa, Mo., Neb., Nev., N.M.,
Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., S.D., Va., Wash.
" Having restriction in 194o: Cal., Conn., Ill., Iowa, Ky., Mich., Minn., N.J., N.Y., Pa., R.I.,
Utah, Vt., W. Va., Wis. Subsequently adopting restriction: Idaho, La., Neb., Nev., N.M., Ohio, Okla.,
Va., Wash.
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Loan sharks still operate to varying extents in the District of Columbia, Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas-all because of the lack of effective
small loan laws. Where these unregulated areas are bordered by states having
modern small loan laws, the loan shark situation is improved by the access of con-
sumers to legitimate loan facilities.
Loan sharks also operate to a relatively minor extent in states having deficient
or only partially effective small loan laws. The task there is to modernize such
laws.
The 1953 loan sharks are a hardy, agile lot, conditioned by having survived half
a century of efforts to eliminate them. As always they thrive best in the centers
of population where dependence on wages is greatest. But today industry flourishes
in small towns and this is being accelerated by the national policy to disperse large
plants. Eight of the twelves states remaining unregulated are in the south where
industrialization has been recent and high-rate illegal lenders are most strongly
entrenched.
There are indications pointing toward the extension of remedial legislation,
however. The increased loan shark activity that has come with industrialization
has aroused new public interest in the problem. Rumblings of public discontent
with unregulated lenders are heard in all the unregulated states. In Arkansas, the
unconstitutionality of a 1951 loan law and the futile attempt in 1952 to amend the
constitution were widely publicized and may have laid the ground work for con-
structive action. In Texas, bar association committees and many others are earnestly
striving for law enforcement and a constitutional amendment. In Kansas, the At-
torney General has recently instituted injunction and receivership proceedings
against numerous loan shark offices.' 5 All these situations will, of course, be liqui-
dated eventually.
III
NEWER TYPES OF CONsUMER LENDERs-THEIR REGULATION
Before 1917 loan sharks were virtually the sole commercial source of loans to
finance family needs. The principal objective of the original small loan laws
therefore was to eliminate loan sharks and create a regulated, comparatively low
cost source of credit to replace them. Other lenders, notably banks, were specifically
exempted from the privileges, regulations, and penalties of the small loan law.
Sales finance transactions have usually been held not to be loans and thus sales
finance companies were, in effect, exempted. 6 The operations of Morris Plan
" Kansas City Times, Aug. 6, x953, P. i; Kansas City Star, Aug. 5, 1953, P. I.
"8See Cady L. Daniels v. Fenton, 97 Colo. 409, 50 P. 2d 62 (1935); Black v. Contract Purchase
Corp., 327 Mich. 636, 42 N. W. 2d 768 (1950); People v. Morse, 270 Ill. App. 207 (1933); Porter
v. Stolkin, ioi Ind. App. 705, 20o N. E. 74 (1936); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Swain, 176
So. 636 (La. App. 1937). Such transactions are occasionally held to be loans under the usury laws.
E.g., Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 22o Ark. 6oi, 249 S. W. 2d 973 (952); Schuck v.
Murdock Acceptance Corp., 22o Ark. 56, 247 S. W. 2d x (X952); Milo Theater Corp. v. National
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lenders (now called industrial loan companies) created minor problems but they
were usually exempted. Credit unions, pawnbrokers, and sometimes remedial loan
associations, were also exempted because special statutory regulations were otherwise
provided for them.
This centering of legislative attention on loan sharks and licensed lenders worked
out very well while other types of lenders did not make small loans in substantial
volume. The field was circumscribed by the actual practices and the law covered
the entire field. By the late nineteen thirties banks and industrial loan companies,
however, were making a large volume of small loans. During World War II when
consumers' durable goods were not available, the sales finance companies also
entered the consumer loan business. As the participation of these three compara-
tively unregulated groups expanded in this field, their operations increasingly over-
lapped those of licensed lendersP"
Most of the new consumer lenders were usually reasonable in their average
charges although their methods of operation produced a wide range of rates of
charge, very high under certain circumstances.
Because they were exempted from the small loan law and not licensed under it,
they remained subject to the general usury laws which their charges violated. To
camouflage this and for competitive reasons they elected to conceal their true rates.
and amounts of charges by discounting an amount of interest computed on the
original face of paper repayable in installments, by charging fees and fines, and
by failing to give full rebates on prepayment. This behavior was another result of
the law lagging behind economic changes.
These conditions led to piecemeal legislative action which, unfortunately, lacked
any consistent plan or philosophy. Because this did not develop until toward the
end of the Russell'Sage Foundation's activity, it did not perfect model bills applicable
to the new types of consumer lenders. The Foundation did propose an experi-
mental personal loan bill for banks which was rejected by the banks as too onerous,
although Nebraska enacted a modified version3 s A similar effort for a model sales
finance act also failed for the same reason. The statutory regulation which subse-
quently developed was the result of uncoordinated legislative action based on the
fortuitous circumstances surrounding each separate enactment.
Banks. New York in 1936 enacted a fairly comprehensive regulatory law ap-
plicable to the personal loan departments of banks1 Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania later enacted laws providing some degree of regulation for the
Theater Supply, 71 Idaho 435, 233 P. 2d 425 (1g5i); White v. Disher, 232 N. C. a6o, 59 S. E. 2d 798
(195o); Nazarian v. Lincoln Finance Corp., 77 R. I. 497, 78 A. 2d 7 (195i); Associates Inv. Co. v.
Sosa, 241 S. W. 2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 195); G.F.C. Corp. v. Williams, 231 S.W. 2d 565 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950); Gifford v. State, 229 S. W. 2d 949 (Tex Civ. App. ig5o). See Berger, Usury in Instalment
Sales, 2 LAW & CoNrTaa. PzoB. 148 (935); Note, Are Installment Plans Usurious?; 36 MINN. L. REv.
744 (952).
1 NUGENT, CONSUMER CREDIT AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 1I0 (RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION, 5939).
"
5 NEB. R V. STAT. §§8-8oi to 8-814 (i943), Cum. Supp. §8-8z2 (1951). For reception of model
bill, see 2 GLENN, BRANDT AND ANDREWS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 544.
"'N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 882; N. Y. BANKING LAW §So8, subd. 2(a).
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consumer loan operations of banks. The initial bank legislation tended merely to
set maximum amounts and to validate discounts, fees, delinquency and collection
charges, and other methods of operation without providing regulations in the
borrowers' interest. The seriousness of these omissions remains to be appraised.
The strict regulations of the small loan law are scarcely needed in the case of banks,
but some degree of regulation is essential. Their consumer loans are in larger
average amounts, a fact which implies less necessitous borrowers. The responsible
nature of the average bank affords a certain protection to the borrower, although it
may also tend to lull him.
Twenty states now have laws authorizing banks to make charges on installment
loans exceeding the general usury law maxima.20 Four additional states (Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, Maine, and Rhode Island) have such laws but they are re-
stricted to savings banks and savings departments of commercial banks. In 23
states, including the above 4, banks may make installment loans without special
authorization, either because they are not subject to interest restriction,21 or the
usury law permits a comparatively high rate of interest," or other laws permit
greater charges on installment loans than the general usury maxima.23
Industrial loan companies. Their early operations were another effort to supply
a demand which antiquated usury laws at that time made it impossible to supply on
a legal basis. Industrial loan companies originally relied on the sale of investment
certificates as a device to conceal the rates of charge on loans. By requiring the
borrower to purchase an investment certificate on the installment plan and by
crediting his payments to the purchase instead of to the loan, the true rate of charge
was made less apparent. They also used expense charges, delinquency fines, and
other devices to eke out a commercially practicable rate of charge.2 Their average
charges obtained by the discount and fee method only, aggregated about 17 per cent
per year, but these were greatly increased in the average case by other means.25
These companies eventually obtained enabling laws in 29 states2" and Hawaii,
most of which contain virtually no provisions protecting the borrower. The more
recent laws and amendments provide some protection in the form of "more candid
authorization of rates of charge,- requirement of a refund on prepayment when
"°Del. (1935), Fla. (I94), Ind. (1951), Iowa (1945), Ky. (1946), Mich. (1929), Minn. (1945),
Miss. (940), Neb. (943), N. J. (1936), N. Y. (1936), N. C. (I937), Ohio (1935), Ore. (1953), Pa.
(1945), S.D. (1953), Tex. (1943), Va. (938), W. Va. (i943), Wis. (I943). The Del., Ind., and
S. D. laws are not restricted to banks. For citations to bank installment loan laws, as of 1952, see
BARRETr, op. cit. supra note 4.
'x Cal., Colo., Conn., La. (discounted interest not restricted by usury law), Me., N. H.
"Ark., Kan., Mass., Mont., Nev., N.M., Okla., R.I., Utah, Wash.
23 Ala., Ariz., Ga., Md. (Industrial Finance Law), Mo. (general consumer loan law), S. C., Wyo.
21See ROBINSON AND NUGENT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 91; SAULNIER, INDUSTRIAL BANKING COM-
PANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTICES 43 (NAT. BuR. OF EcoN. Ras., 1940); INDUSTRIAL BANKING LEoAL
DIGEST 312 (CoNsuMER BANKING INSTITUTE, 1945).
2'Newv Morris Plan, Time, Nov. 13, 1933, P. 47, co. I. See also SAULNIER, id. at 92.
20 Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Fla., Ga., Ind., Ky., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mont., Neb., N.Y.,
N.C., Ohio, Ore., Pa. R.I, S.C., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Va., Wash., W. Va., Wis. For citations to these
laws and reprints of some of them, as of 1952, see BARRsrr, op. cit. supra note 4.
"
7 CAL. FINANCIAL CODE ANN. §§18655, 18656 (i95I); IND. STAT. ANN. §18-3107 (Burns, 1950);
NEB. RaV. STAT. §8-401 (943).
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charges are taken in advance, and restriction against repetition of fee charges. Among
such laws are the Maryland Industrial Finance Law s (1945) with a $1,5oo maxi-
mum, the Pennsylvania Consumer Discount Company Act (1937) with a $2,ooo
maximum, amended in x947;o an old Wisconsin statute with a $2,ooo maximum,
amended in 1947;' and the Indiana Industrial Loan and Investment Act, as
amended. 1  These four laws are used by small loan licensees to make loans in
amounts larger and at rates somewhat lower than those permitted by small loan
laws.
Sales Finance Companies. Installment vendors and the sales finance companies
which purchase their sale contracts at a discount, operate on the legal theory that
such transactions are not loans and hence are not subject to the usury and small
loan laws. These transactions were virtually unregulated in 194o except in Indiana,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. 2 With the extension of sales financing to inexpensive
articles, soft goods, and luxuries, the abuses inevitably multiplied and called for
regulation to protect the buyers. By 1953, 16 states and Hawaii had imposed varying
degrees of regulation on sales financing.33 The only common feature of these laws
is the requirement that the terms and related.information of sales contracts be dis-
closed-an essential requirement in any consumer credit transaction. This is the
sole requirement found in the Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia laws. Most
of such laws also provide for licensing of sales finance companies and sometimes
dealers, and require refunds of unearned charges on prepaymentO4 Some fix maxi-
mum finance charges.
Sales finance companies have expanded into the small loan field. This can
legally be done in most states only by obtaining a license under the applicable small
loan or other consumer loan law. The Oregon Motor Vehicle Finance Act"5 regu-
lates lending on automobile security. The question at once arises whether con-
ducting the small loan and sales financing businesses together will "facilitate evasion
of the small loan law" and require denial of the license. The Nebraska small loan
law was recently amended to permit the small loan business to be operated in con-
junction with the sales finance and insurance businesses, 6 a questionable step.
2
'Mn. CODE ANN. Art. ii, §§I63-2o5 (195I).
"PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§761-1 to 761-x9 (939 & Supp.).
"Ws- STAT. §115.09 (95).
"IND. STAT. ANN. §§18-31oi to J8-3125 (Burns, 195o & Supp.).
"I1nd. Laws 1935, c. 231; Mass. Acts 1939, C. 509; Wis. Laws 1935, C. 474.
"States ma red with asterisk restricted to automobile financing: Cal.* (945), Colo.* (95), Conn.
(947), Hawaii (941), Ind. (1935), Me.* (I939), Md. (I94X), Mass. (1937), Mich.* (939, 1950),
Nev.* (r953), N.J. (1948), N.Y. (x94), Ohio (x949), Pa.* (x947), Utah (953), Va. (1944), Wis.*
(1935). For citations to and reprints of sales finance laws, as of 1952 , see BAmmuTrr, op. cit. supra note
4.
3" For a classification and discussion of provisions of sales finance laws, see Mors, State Regulation
of Retail Instalment Financing-Progress and Problems, 23 J. OF Bus. U. or Cm. z99 (195o), 24 J, oV
Bus. U. OF CH. 43 (I95I); Donaldson, fn Analysis of Retail Installment Sales Legisa'ion, 19 RocKY
MT. L. Ruv. 135 (947); Regulation of Retail Installment Sales: New Statute in Ohio, 63 HARv. L.
Rav. 874 (1950).
"ORE. CoMp. LAws ANN. §42-401 to 42-426 (940 & Supp. 1943).
"
6Neb. Laws r953, L.B. 280.
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The possibility of abuses arising out of the conduct of the two businesses together
has been suggested in several cases. A licensed Ohio lender purchased an automo-
bile installment sale contract and refinanced it by a small loan without refunding
the unearned finance charge, and the court ruled against the lender3 7 In California
a licensed lender made a loan partly to finance the purchase of a truck which the
lender sold to the borrower under a mortgage; the lender was held to have violated
the Motor Vehicle Installment Sales ActOs A California legislative committee found
that sales finance companies were refinancing sales contracts under the small loan
law without refunding unearned sales finance charges, and that this practice re-
sulted in misdirected criticism of the small loan law 39
Defects in regulation of consumer lenders. The continuing hodge-podge of
differing rates, methods of rate statement, regulations, and administrative systems
in the regulated states presents a most serious problem and a challenging opportu-
nity in the consumer credit field.40 The great need to integrate and harmonize these
laws is illustrated in states where there is a weak companion law to a strong small
loan law. There the companion act provides a ready means of avoiding the re-
strictions of the small loan law.
Oregon and Utah have adequate small loan laws but their industrial loan laws
permit discount and fee charges yielding more than 2 per cent a month and, under
some circumstances, more than 3 per cent a month,4°* with meager protection of the
borrower. Lenders may choose the law under which they will operate. South
Dakota in 1953 enacted a small loan law and also a discount and fee loan law; the
latter, though intended primarily for banks, is already being used by other lenders
to avoid the small loan law. In Wisconsin effective regulation of consumer loans
was handicapped by sections of the usury act which permitted sufficient charges for
the larger loans, under which both licensed and unlicensed lenders made loans. In
1947 the sections were revised41 and surrounded by regulatory safeguards, including
restrictions on the refinancing of loans under a different law than that under which
they were made.
In several states licensees under the small loan law also make loans exceeding
$300 under other laws which provide inadequate regulation and do not mesh with
the small loan law. Massachusetts licensees charge more for the larger loans which
are subject only to the Tender Act42 than for loans of $300 or less under the small
" Porter v. Interstate Securities Co., 37 Ohio Op. 194, 79 N. E. 2d 155 (Com. P1. 1948).
"6 Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal. ad 564, 203 P. 2d 758 (1949), construing Cal. Gen.
Laws, Act 5825 (Deering, 1944) and Civil Code, §§2981, 2982 (Deering, 1949).
"6 REPORT OF JOINT LEOISLATIVE Com ITrEE ON LENDING TRANSACTIONS 9 (1949).
"°Bogert, The Future of Small Loan Legislation, 12 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 1 (1944); Hubachek, The
Drift Toward A Consumer Credit Code, 16 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 6og (1949).
,
0
, The Supreme Court of Utah recently stated that the discounting of interest at I per cent per month
and of a 2 per cent fee from a two-year intailment note as authorized by the Industrial Loan Act re-
sulted in an interest rate of 37 per cent per annum. Seaboard Finance Co. v. Wahlen, 26o P. ad 556
(1953).
"Wis. Laws 1947, C. 462, Wls. STAT. §115.07, 115.09 (1951).
"ANN. LAWS MAss., C. 140, §§90-95 (1949).
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loan law, and induce borrowers to take more than $300 to avoid the small loan
law. Similar situations were corrected by legislation in California (1949)' 3 and
Maine (I953)," 4 but still exist in Louisiana and New Hampshire. The same state of
affairs in Colorado was partially corrected under a decision45 which imposed some
regulation above $3oo by reinstating a 1913 loan law which was thought to have
been repealed.
IV
LARGER LOANS AND SMALLER PROFIT MARGINS
On the basis of the studies completed in 1916, the first small loan laws were
drafted to apply only to loans of $3oo and less. The emergency needs of an average
wage earner were then met by $3oo. In 1922-23 the average loan was "somewhere
between $113 and $127."4 The $3oo loan limit was fixed by most small loan laws
which became effective before 1940, with the noteworthy exceptions of the early
Ohio and Nebraska acts which had no size limit. In the seventh draft (I942) the
Foundation stated that a maximum of $4oo or $5oo would be warranted in some
states.
4 7
It became apparent shortly after 1940 that the $3oo loan limit had become in-
sufficient on a nation-wide basis and that failure to increase it was creating serious
mischiefs in the regulatory plan. Individuals whose needs had formerly been
satisfied with $3oo now required $500 to $750 for the same purposes. The original
$15o borrower might now need $35 o . Wage earners were obtaining two, three,
or more loans from different licensees. As rates generally decrease with the in-
creasing size of the loan, borrowers were usually paying higher rates for their money
under two or more loan contracts for smaller amounts. Because the smaller loans
cost the lender more per dollar lent, dividing up an indebtedness into smaller parts
caused an uneconomic waste.
Between 194o and 1951 the average size of small loans nearly doubled. In Illinois
this increase was from $133 to $252 and the average loan balance increased from
Siio to $2o9.48 The maximum loan under the Illinois law was increased from $300
to $5oo in I947.4'
A loan limit exceeding $3oo has been adopted in 17 states since 1940, including
8 states that replaced an effective $30o limit50 A $5oo limit may now be outmoded;
" CAL. STAT. & CODE AmDTS. 1949, Cc. 595, X033, 1034.
"Me. Acts 1953, C. 215.
"Sullivan v. Siegal, 125 Colo. 544, 245 P. 2d 86o (5952).
4 ROBINSON AND STEARNS, TEN THOUSAND SMALL LOANS 117 (RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION, 1930).
"' Seventh Draft of USLL, n. I, reprinted in BA.RRTrr, op. cit. supra note 4, at 684.
"Analysis of Reports Filed by Personal Finance Companies [for] 1941, p. 7; [same for] 1951, p.
7. Issued by Div. of Small Loans, Dept. of Ins., Ill.
"Ill. Laws 1947, P. 1152.
"o $500: Conn.*, Ill.*, Ind.*, Mich.*, N.J.*, N.M., N.Y.*, Wash.; $6oo: Pa.*; $zooo: Neb., Ohio, Wyo.;
$1,500: Nev.*; $2,500: Me., S.D.; $5,ooo: Cal.; no maximum: Mo. States marked with asterisk had
eflective $300 limit. Missouri has $40o nominal limit but permits larger loans. The original Nebraska
and Ohio laws did not have a maximum loan size. The Washington and South Dakota laws originated
with their current larger loan sizes. The California, Maine, and New Mexico laws had a nominal
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since 1947, 7 states have adopted even larger limits.51 In io of the 19 states where
the small loan limit remains at $300, licensees now can, and generally do, make
larger loans under other laws.5z
Paralleling the decrease of dollar purchasing power as a cause of the increased size
of consumer loans, there has been an expansion of the reasons for borrowing. The
period under review has been one of high employment, increasing wages, im-
proved living standards, and a steady increase in the articles believed by consumers
to be essentials. Yesterday's luxuries are today's needs. The wage earner now
requires goods and services of a higher and more expensive order than ever before.
Wants have tended to be added to needs as an actuating force of consumer bor-
rowing. Much sales finance paper is later refinanced by small loans. Insistent de-
sire is only a little less potent than need, in reducing a borrower's caution and his
bargining power.53 Hence it is almost as desirable socially for the law to equalize
the bargaining power of the wage earner borrowing to fulfill a want as to meet a
necessity. In either case the wage earner would be a likely loan shark victim unless
a regulated source of credit is provided. History has proved that the state must
foster a regulated source of credit for necessitous persons, whether or not it is
also patronized by those of lesser need.
The same economic changes which forced larger loans have greatly increased the
costs of lending. In contrast, maximum rates of charge for larger loans (and in
some states for the smaller loans) have decreased.54 This squeeze of profit margins
has been only partially offset by improved operating efficiency and by the increase
in dollar income per loan resulting from the larger amounts lent. The result has
been a progressively lower rate of net return since i940. 5
The changes which have occurred are illustrated by the statistics in Table I5 for
Iowa and Virginia, which have a maximum $300 loan, for Illinois and New York
which have increased their maximum from $300 to $500 since 1940, for Ohio which
has permitted larger loans since before i94o, and for Wisconsin which has a $300
maximum but has permitted licensees to make larger loans under another law since
before 1940.
maximum loan size of $300 but licensees made larger loans on varying bases. The original Wyoming
maximum loan size was $15o, but licensees made larger loans under a discount law.
Cal., Me., Mo., Nev., Pa., S.D., Wyo.
52 Ariz., Colo., La., Md., Mass., N.H., Ore., R.I., Utah, Wis. ' Hubachek, supra note 8, at 130.
14 E.g., for loans of $300 or less there were the following reductions in maximum rates: Md., from
3-!/z to 3 per cent (1943); Mass., statutory ceiling on Commissioner's rate-fixing power reduced from
3 per cent to marginal 2 per cent (946); N.Y., from 3 per cent on first $15o and 2 per cent on re-
mainder to 2-'/ per cent on first $Soo and 2 per cent on remainder (1941); Va., from 3-Y2 to 2 per
cent (1942), subsequently increased to 2-Va per cent (944). Ohio changed from 3 per cent on the
first $3oo plus a S fee on loans of $5o or less to 3 per cent on the first $x5o and 2 per cent on the
next $15o (1943).
"
5 Phelps, Consumer Finance Company Charges, x6 JOURNAL OF MARKETING 397, 406 (1952).
" Compiled and computed from the published state reports of the officials who supervise small loan
licensees, of the states indicated, by Francis E. Wilcox, Statistician, Household Finance Corporation.
Earnings and expenses per account and in relation to loan balances or assets were computed on the
basis of monthly averages, when available, or the average of the beginning and ending of the year, or,
last choice, year-end figures.





Max. $300 1940 1951 Loans
Max. $300 and $500 1951 No other other
No other Law No other Law Law Law
Iowa Va. Ill. N.Y. Ohio Wisconsin
Gross Income Per Acc't.
Per Month
1940 ......................... $3.04 $2.80 $2.90 $3.22 $3.31 $2.70
1951 ......................... $4.37 $3.57 $4.92 $4.40 $5.58 $3.29
% Increase ................... 43.8% 27.5% 69.7% 36.6% 68.6% 21.9%
Expenses, before Interest,
Per Acc't. Per Month
1940 ......................... $2.11 $1.83 $2.00 $2.09 $2.20 $1.76
1951 ......................... $3.35 $2.61 $3.64 $3.12 $3.96 $2.53
% Increase ................... 58.8% 42.6% 82.% 49.3% 80.% 43.8%
Net Income, before Interest,
Per Acct. Per Month
1940 ......................... $0.93 $0.97 $0.90 $1.12 $1.11 $0.94
1951 ......................... $1.02 $0.96 $1.29 $1.28 $1.62 $0.77
% Increase or Decrease ........ 9.7% - 1.0% 43.3% 14.3% 45.9% -18.1%
Annual Net Income, before Interest,
as % of Assets
1940 ......................... 8.92% 11.12% 8.62% 8.82% 6.93% 8.13%
1951 ......................... 6.52% 6.94% 6.57% 6.12% 5.62% 5.28%
% Increase or Decrease ....... -26.9% -37.6% -23.8% -30.6% -18.9% -35.1%
Average Size of Loans Made
1940 ......................... $135 $110 $133 $158 $182 $151
1951 ......................... $205 $201 $253 $295 $362 $198
% Increase ................... 51.9% 82.7% 90.2% 86.7% 98.9% 31.1%
Average Loan Balance, Dec. 31
1940 ......................... $109 $ 92 $110 $127 $154 $120
1951 ......................... $168 $161 $210 $234 $297 $157
% Increase ................... 54.1% 75.0% 90.9% 84.3% 92.9% 30.8%
Average Monthly Rate Collected
1940 ......................... 2.68% 3.17% 2.57% 2.60% 2.16% 2.239
1951 ......................... 2.61% 2.43% 2.40%1 1.96% 1.91%0 2.11
% Increase or Decrease ........- 2.6% 1-23.3% - 6.6% 1-24.6% -11.67 - 5.4%
Increased loan limits were accompanied by sharply reduced rates on the larger
portion of the increased loan. The monthly rate on such large balances is Y2 per
cent in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, /4 per cent in Michigan and
Nebraska, i per cent in Illinois, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming,
and i-Y2 per cent in Maine. In Illinois, Michigan, and Nevada there was a re-
duction also in the maximum charge on loan balances of less than $3oo.
California in 1949 extended its 2 per cent maximum rate between $ioo and
$300 up to $500 and imposed a % per cent per month limit on the larger balancesY7
Indiana in i95r extended its i-V/ per cent rate on loan balances between $150 and
7
CAL. STAT. & CoDa A mis. 1949, c. 1033.
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$3oo up to $5ooYs South Dakota in 1953 set a maximum of % per cent per month
on balances between $3o0 and $2,500
As a result of the reduction in rates of profit, many lenders who previously
charged less than the legal limits have increased their rates toward the maximum
with consequent reduction of competition between lenders. Resistance to further
lowering of legal maximum rates and support for rate increases are increasing.
Evasive devices to increase charges are on the increase, notably the forced tie-in sale
of credit life and disability insurance.
V
CONVENIENCE AND ADVANTAGE PROVISION
The most complex administrative problem which has arisen sinee 194o concerns
the determination of whether a small loan license "will promote the convenience
and advantage of the community in which the business of the applicant is to be
conducted." This provision originated in the fifth draft of USLL in 1932 and is
now found in slightly varied forms in the small loan laws of 23 states.60 Its main
purpose was to prevent over lending and the attendant'evils resulting from excessive
competition.6 ' There is a strong difference of opinion among informed persons as
to whether this provision has accomplished its purpose and whether it is a desirable
addition to the USLL. It has been applied with varying degrees of strictness in
different states and sometimes at different times within the same state.
The meaning of "convenience and advantage," and to a lesser extent of "com-
munity," as applied to specific factual situations has been before numerous licensing
officials and several courts. These terms provide sufficiently definite standards to
satisfy constitutional restrictions on delegation of legislative power, the requirement
having been uniformly sustained against constitutional attack.6 2 New judicial in-
terpretations must occur, however, before "the convenience and advantage of the
community" will acquire a predictable meaning. Decisions involving comparable
restrictions in the banking, public utility, and radio field are only moderately helpful
as the factual situations are so differentes
8 Ind. Laws 1951, c. 86. "gS.D. Laws 1953, S.B. 349.
"' For states having the provision, see note 12 supra. In Massachusetts the administrator's regulations
attempt to impose a convenience and advantage requirement. The provision was omitted from the
Model Consumer Finance Act.
"' Sixth Draft of USLL, n. 14; Sullivan, Administrion of a Regulatory Small Loan Law, 8 LAw &
CorsqTMP. PROB. r46, 148 ('94'); Household Finance Corp. v. Gaffney, 2o N.J. Super. 394, 90 A. 2d
85 (1957), afl'd, ii N. J. 576, 95 A. 2d 412 (r953).
"Kelleher v. Minshull, ii Wash. 2d 38o, ri9 P. 2d 302 (941); Family Finance Corp. v. Gaffney,
xi N.J. 565, 95 A. 2d 407 (1953); Family Finance Corp. v. Gough, zo N.J. Super. 13, 76 A. 2d 82
(1950); Motors Acceptance Corp. v. McLain, 154 Neb. 354, 47 N. W. 2d 99 (95); Equitable Loan
Society, Inc. v. Bell, 339 Pa. 449, 14 A. 2d 316 (940), app. dis., 311 U. S. 621 (1940).
"'See Hall, Certificates of Convenience and Necessity, 28 MIcH. L. Rav. 107 (5929), 276 (1930);
Note, Radio Regulation and Freedom of the Air, 54 HA.uv. L. REv. i22o (941); Bank of Italy v.
Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 251 P. 784 (1926); Weer v. Page, 155 Md. 86, 141 A. 518 (1928); State ex rel.
Dybdal v. State Securities Commission, 145 Minn. 221, 176 N.W. 759 (1920). For comment as to need
for administrative licensing standards under Michigan small loan law, see Staff Report to the Michigan
Joint Legislative Committee on Reorganization of State Government, 1953, p. 28-11-47.
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When supported by adequate findings and proof, administrative denials of
licenses under this provision have been upheld by the courts, 4 but the opinions
have neither identified the controlling factors nor indicated the weight to be given
to each. The administrative findings and conclusions do not settle on any criteria
as decisive.
In New Jersey proceedings,65 the Commissioner has considered such factors as
population, retail sales per licensee in the community compared to those throughout
the state, whether a city is a trade center for outlying territory, the number of banks
and credit unions making similar loans in the community, competition between
licensees in other cities and licensees in the community, and whether existing licensees
have sufficient capital and credit to meet the community's demand for consumer
loans.6 A New Jersey decision indicates that the "community" is not necessarily
the area within municipal boundaries.6 7
The New Jersey and Washington commissioners and courts have disregarded
the fact that an applicant charged a lower rate than existing licensees. 8 In contrast,
the New York administrator gave weight to a stipulation providing for cancellation
of the license if the applicant should increase its charge above 2 per cent per month,
which was less than the maximum permitted rate, and was upheld by a trial
court.69
Provisions requiring a hearing have been interpreted and enforced in two cases. 70
New Jersey courts have held that the licensing official must make findings of fact
to support a denial. 7' In Washington, where the Act provides for a trial de novo
on appeal from a denial, the Supreme Court held that this was an unconstitutional
delegation of non-judicial power to the courts.72
VI
CREDIT LIFE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE
The prohibition against extra charges in the small loan law is in such sweeping
terms that it should be construed to prohibit credit insurance charges, except in a
few states where they are specifically authorized.
"'Motors Acceptance Corp. v. McLain, 154 Neb. 354, 47 N. NV. 2d 99 (195i); Family Finance
Corp. v. Gaffney, ii N.J. 565, 95 A. 2d 407 (1953); Household Finance Corp. v. Gaffney, xx NJ. 576,
95 A. 2d 412 (1953); Household Finance Corp. v. State, 40 Wash. 2d 451, 244 P. 2d 26o (1952).
"See Sullivan, supra note 61.
"
6 Family Finance Corp. v. Gaffney, ix N.J. 565, 95 A. 2d 407 (x953).
"'Household Finance Corp. v. Gaffney, 2o N.J. Super. 394, 9o A. 2d 85 (1952), aff'd, ix N.J.
576, 95 A. 2d 412 (953). Apparently the New Jersey Commissioner has accepted this view. See
findings summarized in Family Finance Corp. v. Gaffney, xx N.J. 565, 95 A. 2d 407 (1953).
" Household Finance Corp. v. Gaffney, 2o N.J. Super. 394, 9o A. 2d 85 (x957), afl'd, i N.J.
576, 95 A. 2d 412 (1953); Household Finance Corp. v. State, 40 Wash. 2d 451, 465, 244 P. 2d 26o,
268 (1952).
"' Personal Finance Co. of New York v. Lyon, x2 N.Y. S. 2d 72 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. i953).
"
0 Deutsch v. Department of Insurance, 397 Ill. 2x8, 73 N. E. 2d 304 (1947); Family Finance
Corp. v. Gough, xo N.J. Super. 13, 76 A. 2d 82 (1950).
"Household Finance Corp. v. Gaffney, xx N.J. 576, 95 A. 2d 412 (x953); Family Finance Corp.
v. Gough, io N. J. Super. 13, 76 A. 2d 82 (1950).
"Household Finance Corp. v. State, 40 Wash. 2d 451, 244 P. 2d 26o (1952); Lewis, Household
Finance Case: Statutory Review of Discretionary Power to License, 28 WAsH. L. REv. 146 (1953).
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The recent interest of licensees in obtaining extra profits from selling credit
insurance is due to various factors, including: the entrance into the consumer finance
business of lenders who had previously made loans only upon security and were
not familiar with the philosophy of the USLL; the reduction in profit margins
already mentioned; and the mushroom growth of small insurance companies spe-
cializing in insurance sold in connection with consumer credit transactions.
Insurance as security for necessitous small loans is foreign to the original con-
cepts of the USLL. Most small loans to consumers are not secured, in the customary
sense of the word.7 Originally only two types of security were commonly taken,
mortgages on household goods and wage assignments.74 Such mortgages, usually
unrecorded, were valuable only for psychological effect,76 and wage assignments
merely assure delivery of part of the borrower's earnings which remain the primary
source for repayment.
The practice of requiring or selling credit life, health and accident insurance
began in areas of consumer credit which were not subject to the small loan law. The
first litigation over insurance charges under small loan laws involved merely the
licensee's right to require insurance on automobile security and did not involve his
profiting from the sale of insurance. The hazardous nature of automobile security
and the lack of profit to the lender made a strong case. Applying the reasoning
by which extra charges incident to the furnishing of security have been sustained
under general usury laws, several state courts resolved the issue in favor of the
lender.7
Encouraged by these decisions applicable to insurance sold in good faith by
third parties, some licensees started to sell credit life and disability insurance to their
borrowers, profiting from the commissions in addition to the statutory charge. It
was contended that credit insurance is necessary and that borrowers usually want
it when offered. Both contentions disregard the fact that from 40 per cent to over
"Seventh Draft of USLL §r, F. W. RYAN, USURY AND USURY LAWS 134, 135 (924); Eskildson, The
Small Loan Problem in Colorado, U. oF DENVER REP. 9 (Dec. 1942). This concept and the need for
greater charges than the general usury maximum to cover the greater risk are expressly recognized in
some laws: Fla. Laws 1925, c. 10177, Preamble; Md. Laws 1918, c. 88, Preamble; N. M. STAT. ANN.
§5o-62o (Supp. 1951); Nev. Comp. Laws 1943-1949 §753. Also in court decisions: Davis Loan
Co. v. Blanchard, 14 La. App. 671, 129 So. 413, reh. denied, 130 So. 472 (1930); Liberty Finance Co.,
Inc. v. Catterton, 161 Md. 65o, 158 A. 16 (932); Lackawanna Thrift & Loan Corp. v. Kabatchnick,
145 Pa. Super. 52, 2o A. 2d 903 (1941). See also Girard Investment Co. v. Commissioner of Int.
Rev., 122 F. 2d 843 (3 d Cir. 1941); Ex parte Fuller, 15 Cal. 2d 425, 102 P. 2d 321 (1940); Westville
& Hamden Loan Co. v. Pasqual, 1O9 Conn. 110, 145 A. 758 (z929).
" ROBINSON AND STEARNS, 0. cit. supra note 46, at 138; YOUNo, PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES AND
THEIR CREDIT PRACTICES 49 (NAT. BUR. OF ECON. RES., 1940).
"' NEIFELD, THE PERSONAL FINANCE BUSINESS 153, 156 (1933); Foster, The Personal Finance Business
Under Regulation, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 154, 168 (1941).
" Platz v. Lapinski, 263 Mich. 240, 248 N. W. 607 (X933); Auto Owners' Finance Co., Inc. v.
Coleman, 89 N.H. 356, x99 A. 365 (1938); Maellaro v. Madison Finance Co., 13o N.J. L. 140, 31
A. 2d 485 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 131 N.J. L. x6o, 35 A. 2d 714 (944); Martorano v. Capital Finance
Corp., 289 N.Y. 21, 43 N. E. 2d 705, 143 A. L. I. 1318 (1942). The lower New York courts had
reached the contrary result in Martorano v. Capital Finance Corp., 263 App. Div. 79, 31 N.Y. S. 2d 643
(Ist Dep't 1941), reV'd, 289 N.Y. 21, 43 N. E. 2d 705, 143 A. L. R. 1318 (942); Krulik v. Confi-
dential Personal Loan Co., 176 N.Y. Misc. 138, 26 N.Y. S. 2d 676 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1941).
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8o per cent of the prefiiium is retained by the lender, directly or indirectly. Profiting
from the sale of credit insurance in addition to the charges permitted by the small
loan laws violates the cardinal principle of a single, all-inclusive maximum rate of
charge. It opens the door to manipulations and devices. Whenever anything has
been sold in connection with small loans, abuses have resulted.7" Like vitamin pills,
life and disability insurance may be good for borrowers, but licensed lenders should
no more be permitted to profit from tie-in sales of insurance than from tie-in sales
of vitamin piUs.78
Tie-in sales have always been a favorite device of loan sharks. Pipes, door
mats, inkwells, and other articles of small value have been sold at high prices to
obtain hidden profits.79 Such sales are unmanageable elements in relation to a
definite and enforceable ceiling on the charges of consumer creditors. If an over-
all maximum charge cannot be defined and enforced, regulation breaks down.
In the last analysis, open and honest competition between consumer creditors
of all types is the strongest hope of the consumer debtor. If a licensee may ad-
vertise i per cent a month and obtain 3 per cent by profits on tie-in sales, other
licensees cannot compete except by similar methods; the debtor cannot select the
lowest price s and the state cannot enforce a rate ceiling. A return to pre-i916
jungle tactics would seem inevitable.
It is a hopeful development that several of the larger licensee companies have
commenced to provide their borrowers with the cheaper group credit life insurance,
free of extra charge.
Strong pressure has been generated, however, for legislation authorizing lenders
to sell such insurance. Small loan laws so amended include Louisiana (1952)81 and
Nebraska (,953).2 The Missouri law (i95i) delegates the problem to the enforce-
ment official, who by regulation permits the sale of decreasing term life insurance.
The new South Dakota law (1953) permits lenders to sell credit insurance to bor-
rowers of more than $"o. In New Mexico it is sold under implied authority of a
1949 restrictive act.s3 In Colorado where credit insurance sales were tolerated for
a time, the Governor vetoed a 1953 bill which would have permitted small loan
licensees to sell credit life insurance.
" See Parish, Credit Life, Health and Accident Insurance and the Small Loan Industry, 6 N. M. Bus.
3 (COLLEGE OF Bus. ADMIN., U. OF N.M., JUNE, 1953).
"8 An.unlicensed lender was recently held to have violated the Michigan small loan law by tie-in sales
of vitamin pills. People v. Coleman, 59 N. W. 2d 276 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1953).
"'See Willis v. Buchnan, i99 So. 886 (Ala. App. 194o), ret'd on other grounds, 24o Ala. 386, i99
So. 892 (1940); People v. Vanderpool, 114 P. 2d 6o8 (Cal. App. 194), rev'd on other grounds, 20
Cal. 2d 746, 128 P. 2d 513; People v. Silverberg, 33 N.Y. Cr. 46, i6o N.Y. S. 727 (915), afl'd, 171
App. Div. 914, 155 N.Y. S. 1132 (ist Dep't 1915).
S°Yntema, The Market for Consumer Credit: A Case in "Imperfect Competition," x96 ANNALS 79
(March, 1938); Phelps, Monopolistic and Imperfect Competition in Consumer Loans, 8 JouRNAL OF
MARKETING 382 (944).
S1 La. Acts 1952, No. 169. The Louisiana amendment nullified a 1951 decision of the Louisiana
Court of Appeals. Home Finance Co. v. Padgett, 54 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 1951).
:'Neb. Laws 1953, L. B. 280.
sa N.M. Laws 1949, C. 130, as amended by N.M. Laws 1953, S. B. 240.
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The only appellate court decision sustaining a charge for credit life insurance
by a licensee under an orthodox small loan law was a test case on unrealistic facts
pleaded by the lender and admitted by demurrer s4 When the validity of such a
charge was squarely challenged in another state, it was held to violate the small
loan law."" In accord with this decision are opinions of the Colorado and Illinois
Attorneys General." These rulings are supported by decisions involving tie-in sales




Constitutional Interest Maxima. The constitutions of Arkansas, Oklahoma, Ten-
nessee, and Texas limit interest charges to a rate of io per cent per annum. As
consumer lending cannot be profitable at this rate, these constitutional limitations
prevent enactment of effective small loan laws. Various legislative attempts to evade
or avoid these limitations have failed.
The Arkansas installment loan act of 1951ss purported to authorize certain ex-
pense and service charges in addition to io per cent interest. The Arkansas Supreme
Court held the authorization unconstitutional as an attempt to authorize interest
charges exceeding the constitutional limit under various disguises89 The act was
later repealed.9
The Tennessee small loan act9 ' originally attempted to permit an expense charge
of 3 per cent per month in addition to lawful interest. This act was interpreted to
limit rather than authorize expense charges and, as so interpreted, was held con-
stitutional.92
The Oklahoma small loan law93 authorizes, in addition to interest, an initial
charge to cover costs of making the loan and monthly fees to cover carrying costs.
This act has not yet been submitted to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
Texas has two laws which purport to legalize charges in addition to interest.
8" Mills v. Parrott, 237 S. W. 2d 851 (Ky. '951). The action was brought after anothei lender
dismissed an appeal from a decision that charges for credit life insurance violated the Kentucky small
loan law. Lewis v. Interstate Loan Corp., Jefferson Cir. Ct., Chan. Br., 2d Div., No. 30596o (948).
"See note 81 supra.
"Colo., Opinion No. 971-47 (March 7, 1947) and Opinion dated Oct. 17, 1952. Ill., Opinion
dated July 2x, 195o.
"TStrickler v. State Auto Finance Co., 22o Ark. 565, 249 S. W. ad 307 (1952); Commonwealth
ex rel. Grauman v. Continental Co., 275 Ky. 238, 12s S. W. ad 49 (1938); Jernigan v. Loid Rainwater
Co., 196 Ark. 251, 117 S. W. 2d 18 (1938); In re Graham, 2z F. Supp. 233 (W. D. Ky. 1938); Peebles
v. State, 87 Ga. App. 649, 75 S. E. 2d 35 (1953). There are decisions, however, sustaining the re-
quirement of life insurance under usury laws when the circumstances showed that the requirement was
bona fide. HuBACHsX, op. cit. supra (note 2, at x68.
"Ark. Acts I95I, No. 203.
"Winston v. Personal Finance Co. of Pine Bluff, Inc., ao Ark. 58o, 249 S. W. 2d 315 (1952);
Strickler v. State Auto Finance Co., 22o Ark. 565, 249 S. W. ad 307 (1952).
" Ark. Acts 1953, No. 391.
"TENN. CoDE ANat. §§6721-6743 (Williams, 1941).
"Koen v. State, x62 Tenn. 573, 39 S. W. 2d 283 (1930).
"' OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§280.1-280.29 (Supp. 1952).
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A 1949 actO4 would legalize the sale of credit life and disability insurance to con-
sumer borrowers and the receipt of commissions by lenders. A 1951 acto3 would
authorize industrial loan corporations to collect expense charges and to make tie-in
installment sales of their investment certificates to borrowers. The Texas Supreme
Court has not yet determined their constitutionality, but each act has been upheld
by a Court of Civil Appeals. The Texas Supreme Court has granted a writ of error
from a curious decision on the 1951 act.O'
The legality of extra charges under any such law will be subject to challenge
by the borrower in each transactionf 7 Even if specific charges should be sustained
under such a law in an individual case or cases, it would not provide a sound basis
for conducting a consumer finance businessYs It would seem that an effective solu-
tion of the loan shark problem in these four states must await amendment or repeal
of their constitutional interest limitations.
Arkansas recently attempted to submit such an amendment to the voters, but
their Supreme Court ordered it stricken from the ballot because of defects in form0
The Texas Bar Association has recommended a constitutional amendment and the
proposal has widespread support.
Until these constitutional road blocks to sound consumer finance legislation are
swept away, the best that can be expected would be only partially effective laws
based, in the last analysis, on sham or avoidance.
Missouri Constitutional Provision. A unique provision of the Missouri Consti-
tution of I945' as interpreted by the Missouri Supreme Court,10' prohibits classi-
fication of lenders for the purpose of fixing maximum interest rates. In 1947 it
was held to have repealed the prior small loan law.'0 2  Missouri was thereafter
without a consumer loan law until the enactment of new legislation in 1951.103 This
legislation consists of two acts which embody many of the basic principles of
modern small loan regulation. It satisfies the constitutional requirement by making
the maximum rate applicable to and available to all lenders.
"Tex. Acts 1949, c. 491; ANN. Tax. STAT., Insurance Code, Art. 3.53 (Vernon, 1952).
'Tex. Acts I95r, C. 472; ANN. Tax. STAT. Art. 1524a-i (Supp. 1952).
"" Steiner v. Community Finance & Thrift Corp., 258 S. W. 2d 129, 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953):
"The issues discussed hereinabove .. . substantiate the opinion here expressed that in the absence of
precedent which is considered binding on the court, an examination of the statute and the entire
transaction here in issue, impels the opinion that Art. 1524a-i is merely a cloak under which usurious
interest is charged in violation of the Constitution of the State of Texas." The 1949 act was sustained
in Hatridge v. Home Life & Accident Ins. Co., 246 S. W. 2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
'*See Family Loan Co. v. Hickerson, 168 Tenn. 36, 73 S. W. 2d 694 (X934); Personal Finance
Co. v. Hammack, 163 Tenn. 641, 45 S. W. 2d 528 (1932); Golightly v. Hermitage Loan Co., x7 Tenn.
70, oo S. W. 2d 654 (1937).
98 Donaldson, Small Loan Legislation in Texas, 2o Tax. L. REv. x86, 192 (1941): "... the lender
would be constantly beset by the uncertainty of whether his expense charges were legal or illegal and
whether his notes were fully collectable. No legitimate business can prosper or long continue under
such a cloud."
"' Bradley v. Hall, 220 Ark. 925, 251 S. NV. 2d 470 (1952). "'Art. I1, 644.
... Household Finance Corp. v. Shaffner, 356 Mo. 808, 203 S. NV. ad 734 (947).
102 Ibid.
"' Mo. Laws 1951, pp. 262, 875; ANN. Mo. STAT. §§367.1o-367.ao, 408.100-408.220 (Vernon,
1952).
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One act amended the usury law to authorize certain charges exceeding the
general 8 per cent maximum on loans of $400 or less, with certain exceptions 04
The authorized and the maximum rate is 2.218 per cent per month, subject to
various regulatory provisions. The second act provides for the licensing and super-
vision of lenders engaged in the business of making unsecured loans and loans se-
cured by personal property or wage assignments. It applies whether or not the
lender's charges exceed the general usury maximum. Banks and other lenders
supervised under different laws are exempted from the second act. Special features
of the combined legislation include permission to charge the small loan rate on the
$4oo portion of a larger loan and to contract for charges either as a percentage
interest rate or as a precomputed dollar amount. These and other unusual features
are designed to make the maximum rate applicable to and the authorized rate
available to all classes of lenders including banks and industrial loan companies.
VIII
TRNm TowARD A CODE
The Missouri i95I legislation, though forced into a peculiar form by consti-
tutional limitations, is the first permissive consumer loan law with a compre-
hensive plan of regulation which embraces all types of lenders without regard to
institutional background, size of loan, method of procedure, or similar character-
istics. The practical working out of this legislation is still to be demonstrated, but,
as an attempt to grant the same permissions with the same limitations to all con-
sumer lenders, it is a bold step to be carefully observed and considered.
There is a discernible trend in legislation toward a uniform system of regula-
tions applicable to consumer creditors and notably to all types of consumer lenders.
The development is not so much toward identical regulations as it is toward an in-
tegrated plan of regulation in which each credit agency is regulated in accordance
with its own peculiarities but in harmony with the regulations of other agencies.
This process is beginning to reduce the differences between the earlier rigid
and the later lax statutes. Small loan companies were originally subjected to
overly strict regulation in the early experimental period. Some of the later re-
strictions have subsequently been made unnecessary by the tremendous growth of
consumer lending by other agencies. Later when banks and other new types of
consumer lenders sought enabling legislation, the increased public understanding of
installment credit had reduced the burden of obtaining legislative approval. Hence
enabling legislation for these agencies contained a minimum of, or no, regulation
to protect the borrower.
In 1944, Professor George C. Bogert noted the need for more uniform legislation
in this field. 0 5 In 1949, this author noted a drift toward a consumer credit code.'
Since 1949, a further drift has occurred. Repeal of the bond requirement in the
'"' Mo. Laws '95i, p. 875.
105 Bogert, supra note 40.
... Hubachek, supr,, note 40.
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New York Small Loan Law, 0 7 exemption of inadvertent overcharges from the
penalties for excessive charges, 08 administrative or statutory permissions to engage
in other businesses, and the increase in small loan size limits are either relaxations of
small loan laws or changes in the direction of more uniform treatment of con-
sumer lenders. In contrast, new legislation applying to other installment creditors
has either tightened existing laws or imposed some degree of regulation for the
first time. The New Jersey Bank Installment Loan Law was strengthened in 195o,
and Indiana (195i) and South Dakota (1953) enacted bank installment loan laws
which, though defective, authorize charges exceeding the usury law and provide some
protection to the borrower.0 9  California (1949) added a refund requirement to its
automobile sales finance law.110 Connecticut (1949) tightened its sales finance law
in material respects."" Michigan (i95o) replaced its rudimentary automobile sales
finance act with a comprehensive regulatory law. 12 Maine (i95i) added to.a frag-
mentary automobile finance law requirements as to disclosure of finance, insurance,
and other charges and as to licensing.113  Wisconsin (1953) added rate regulation
to its 1935 automobile sales finance law." 4 Ohio (949), Colorado (x951), and
Nevada and Utah (i953) enacted sales finance legislation for the first time.P" The
1951 Missouri legislation has already been mentioned. Fourteen additional states
have enacted varying forms of an act prohibiting lenders and finance companies
from requiring customers to buy insurance from'a designated agent.10
Ix
REGULATION W-EoNoMIC CONSIDERATONS
Regulation W was another step in the direction of a code of regulations embracing
all consumer credit agencies. That action was on the economic front and is not
cited to prove what could be done by a state legislature with a code of regulations
intended largely to protect the debtor. Nevertheless, Regulation W disregarded in-
stitutional differences among the sources of consumer credit and many of its pro-
visions were identical for all consumer creditors.
Regulation W was first intended as a war measure to dampen the demand for
consumers' durable goods and thus reduce the pressure on scarce materials and
services. After the national emergency, the Regulation was reimposed on the theory
that consumer credit accentuates booms and retards recovery from depressions." 1
10 7N. Y. Laws 1953, c. 573, §2.
1'* Twelve states now have such an exempion: Cal., Colo., Conn., Ill., Mo., Neb., Nev., N.M., Ohio,
S.D., Utah, Va.
109N.J. Laws 1950, c. 311; Ind. Acts 1951, C. i59; S.D. Laws 1953, C. 15.
11CAL. STAT. & CODE AmDTs. 1949, c. 1594. .. Conn. Laws 1949, Pub. Acts 281, 297.
11 Mich. Pub. Acts x95o (Ex. Sess.) No. 27. "' Me. Laws 1951, C. 361.
", Wis. Laws 1953, c. 302.
1l 123 Ohio Laws 77 (1949); Colo. Laws x9p, c. 81; Nev. Laws 1953, S.B. 2o5; Utah Laws 1953,
C. 24.
' Cal., Conn., Fla., Ga., Ky., La., Me., Mass., N.H., Ohio, Pa., Tenn., Va., Wis. Previously Mich.,
N.J., and N.Y. had enacted such laws. For citations to and reprints of these laws, as of 1952, See
BARRET, Op. ct. supra note 4.
' 62 STAT. 1291; R. P. SHAY, REGULATION W: EXPERIMENT IN CREDIT CONTROL (UNIVERSITY OP
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Some believe that the control of consumer credit will assist in minimizing economic
fluctuations, but others believe that the volume of consumer credit reflects rather
than affects the national economy.
The Regulation came and went three times. A mass of figures was accumulated
concerning conditions during and after each of these periods. What they prove, if
anything, is the subject of a dispute in which this article will not participate. Cer-
tain statistics, however, cast a reasonably clear light on some of the characteristics
of the different kinds of consumer credit and hence are appropriate for this dis-
cussion.
Table H... recapitulates figures issued by the Federal Reserve Board showing the
amounts of installment sale credit and of loans under small loan laws during the
three periods when regulation was in force.
TABLE II
FLUCTUATION OF INSTALLMENT SALE CREDIT AND SMALL LOAN LAW
OuTsTANDiNGs, UNDER REGULATION W
(In millions of dollars)
Small
Total Sale Loan Law
Credit Outstandings
Period Sept. 1, 1941 - Nov. 1, 1947
Outstandings at beginning .................................. $41742 $525
Low point during period .................................... 1,047 342
Outstandings at end ...................................... 3,521 654
% Change - Beginning to low ........................ - 77.9% -34.9%
% Change - Low to end ............................ +236.3% +91.2%
Period Sept. 20, 1948 - June 30, 1949
Outstandings at beginning ................................. $5,530 $807
Outstandings at end ...................................... 6,612 866
% Change ........................................ + 19.6% + 7.3%
Period Sept. 18, 1950 - May 7, 1952 ...............................
Outstandings at beginning .................................. $10,605 $1,040
Outstandings at end ....................................... 10,239 1,333
% Change .......................................... - 3.5% +28.2%
MAINE STuDiEs, SEco) SERiEs, No. 67) 161 (U. oF Ma. BULL., April 1953). See NuGENT, op. cit.
supra note 17.
... Compiled from 39 FED. RES. BULL. 336-354 (April, x953), and from CONSUMER FINANCE Com-
PANIEs LOANS OtrrsrANDIN (mimeo. release of Div. of Res., Fed. Res. Bd., as of May 1953). For
brevity, the dates of some of the above figures have been approximated. Federal Reserve Board figures
for consumer credit have been gathered and issued from time to time on varying bases and with
varying explanations and retroactive adjustments. The author assumes no responsibility for the above
figures beyond stating his belief that, on averages and in general, they reflect the facts they purport to
set forth. Installment sale credit as used in this table is the total of the amounts of "automobile paper"
and "other consumer goods paper," as revised by the Federal Reserve Board in its April Bulletin. These
amounts include loans for the purpose of purchasing goods and are larger than the amounts previously
published which were restricted to credit originated by retail dealers.
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The volume of credit at different times was affected by important factors in addi-
tion to Regulation W.11 The fact that sale credit increased after V-J Day and
during the second period while Regulation W was in force points toward the
absence of consumers' durables during World War II as an important cause of the
large decline in sales finance credit during the first Regulation W period. In the
case of consumer loans, it seems likely that their decline during the first period
was due in large measure to increased income from full employment and the lack
of spending opportunities, because during both the second and third Regulation W
periods the volume of such loans increased greatly notwithstanding the Regulation.
The table also demonstrates that sales finance credit is much more volatile than
loan credit. It shrank to 22 pet cent of its previous volume during the war and
was almost ten times its low point by the end of the third period. In contrast,
small loans only decreased to 65 per cent of their previous volume and by the end
of the third period they were less than four times their low. As small loans are
made principally for needs-expenses which cannot be avoided-their volume cannot
be greatly affected by mere legal fiat. As long as loans for family needs are available
from legal sources they will be obtained there and, if that source is cut off, the de-
mand will "go underground" and be supplied there. That is the essence of com-
bating the loan shark.
Notwithstanding the growth of lending under small loan laws, the volume of con-
sumer loans by licensees is now dwarfed by that of commercial banks and is less
than the aggregate of the other types of consumer lenders. Relative sizes and
rates of growth since i94o are indicated by Table III32°
TABLE III
CONSUMER INSTALL.MENT LOAN OUTSTANDINGS 1940-1952
(In millions of dollars)
Industrial
End of Licensee banks and Miscel- Repair &
Year Total out- Commercial loan Credit laneous moderniza-
standings banks companies unions lenders tion loans
1940 ..... 1,967 498 692 236 174 99 268
1941 ..... 2,143 531 784 241 200 102 285
1942 ..... 1,431 417 426 161 130 91 206
1945 ..... 1,422 439 477 146 103 93 164
1946 ..... 2,352 597 956 215 153 109 322
1947 ..... 3,348 701 1,435 300 225 119 568
1948 ..... 4,072 817 1,709 364 312 131 739
1949 ...... 4,650 929 1,951 425 402 142 801
1950 ...... 5,555 1,084 2,431 494 525 157 864
1951...... 5,964 1,268 2,510 530 542 176 938
1952 ..... -7,108 1,439 3,093 638 698 193 1,047
..9 See SHAY, op. ct. supra note 117.
... Source: 39 Fwv. Rrs. BuLL. 276 (March, 1953). The author has combined the figures for
industrial banks and industrial loan companies. The Federal Reserve Bulletins for April, 1953, and
thereafter contain revised statistics which do not break down installment loan outstandings by types of
lenders or show separately the outstandings under small loan laws. Therefore, the figures in this table
are taken from the March, 1953, Bulletin. See note 118 supra.
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X
THE PRESENT SITUATION
From 1916 through i93o the regulated small loan business fought for survival
against loan sharks and public prejudice. Loan sharks sought to preserve their
business by destroying the small loan laws. Their attack was three-pronged: chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the laws; obtain their repeal; emasculate them by
reducing the permitted rate of charge to an unprofitable level.
Under attack on their constitutionality, small loan laws have always been sus-
tained when drafted in accordance with constitutional title requirements. The last
major attack was on the Washington law (941) and in sustaining it the court
cited the many prior decisions holding small loan laws constitutional. This de-
cision seems finally to have settled the constitutional questionsj1 2i
Attempts to obtain repeal of small loan laws have uniformly failed. No state
legislature has ever repealed an effective small loan law without enacting another
to take its place.
Attacks on rates have met with some success, as in Georgia where the small loan
law is now ineffective because the maximum rate was reduced to i/2 per cent per
month in i935.25 In other states where the rate was reduced, as in New Jersey in
1929 and Virginia in 1942, it was later raised to a workable level after experience
had demonstrated that the reduction was too drastic.1 23 During recent years the
occasional attempts to reduce the permitted rates to an unprofitable level have re-
ceived little support.
During the last fifteen years the consumer credit business has progressed toward
maturity. Most of the banks of the nation had entered the business and Regulation
W had dealt with it as a necessary and vital economic factor so that consumer
lending was fully accepted. The sheer weight of the amounts of money involved
demonstrated its substantial influence on the economy. Understanding and accept-
ance are shown by the fact that securities of sales finance and small loan companies
are listed on the nation's stock exchanges and held in large amounts by insurance
companies, pension funds, and other public institutions. The accessibility of capital
at competitive rates has, of course, helped to hold down the charges to borrowers.
With the burgeoning out of consumer credit generally, the licensed small loan
business has become only a segment of a giant business. The authorized charges of
licensed lenders no longer stand out as exceptions to the usury laws, for many
similar exceptions have been made for other branches of the business. The public
has realized the necessity of higher charges for retail consumer credit than for
wholesale business credit, just as it accepts the higher price of coal by the basket
over carload prices.
"' Kelleher v. Minshull, ix Wash. 2d 380, 119 P. 2d 302 (1941).
122 Ga. Acts 1935, No. 285.
... N. J. Laws 1929, C. 293, Laws 1932, c. 62; Va. Acts 1942, C. 107, Acts 1944, c. 370. See
Nugent, Three Experiments with Small-Loan Interest Rades, 12 HRv. Bus. REv. 35 (1933).
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The public has tended to regard all forms of consumer credit as a single industry
or force. This concept has its dangers. It tends to obscure the special function of
the small loan laws-extending cash credit to wage earners to meet their needs.
It is to be hoped that the public and the legislatures will not overlook this special
function and become less sensitive to the need for firm regulation and an adequate
rate in this segment of consumer credit.
The ready public acceptance of sales financing with its high costs is not difficult
to trace. It stems largely from the primary association with the automobile in-
dustry. In view of the direct relationship between the sales of automobiles and the
employment of large numbers in the industry, the public has not been overly critical
of the method of financing sales. Since the goodwill of customers was at stake,
manufacturers have generally exerted a constructive influence on the practices of
controlled or associated finance companies,124 but competition has worked im-
perfectly in that segment of consumer credit.
The expansion of the consumer credit business in volume, number of sources,
and area of social impact has brought new problems of regulation. Clashes between
the different types of consumer creditors and the inconsistencies between regulatory
laws will continue to plague the business and the administrative officials and also
the public. To the extent that regulatory or enabling laws give one segment a com-
petitive advantage, there will be a continuing demand for equal treatment by those
who feel discriminated against. Since the legality of all consumer lending is based
on exceptions to the usury laws, in states having them, consumer creditors may still
have to fight for existence-not only against outlaw creditors but against their
competitors doing business under other less restrictive laws.
There is general recognition that consumer credit preforms two indispensable
functions: financing family emergencies, which enables our people to cope with
temporary financial difficulties, and financing the purchase of consumers' goods,
without which it would be impossible to create an adequate market to sustain mass
production, low unit costs, and prices within the average family budget. With all
its halting and groping the period since 194o has made reasonably good progress
toward a rational scheme of regulation which will put each segment of the business
in its proper niche and assign to each the privileges and restrictions which it de-
serves-all in the public interest.
That the small loan law is the effective method of eliminating the loan shark
has been abundantly proved. By it more than thirty states have been largely purged
of high-rate, illegal lending. The public task remaining in that direction is to
enact approved new laws in unregulated states and bring the present laws up to
date. In so far as pioneer thinking is concerned, the new problem is to rdgulate
in the public interest the diverse, legitimate, business interests which now provide
this country with some nineteen billion dollars of consumer credit, of which only
about one and one-half billion dollars is provided under small loan laws.
... NUoE.T, op. cit. supra note 17, at 96.
